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Abstract
Paradefinite (‘beyond the definite’) logics are logics that can be used for handling contradictory
or partial information. As such, paradefinite logics should be both paraconsistent and paracom-
plete. In this paper we consider the simplest semantic framework for defining paradefinite logics,
consisting of four-valued matrices, and study the better accepted logics that are induced by these
matrices.
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1 Introduction
Uncertainty in commonsense reasoning and AI involves inconsistent and incomplete informa-
tion. Paradefinite logics (called ‘non-alethic’ by da Costa and ‘paranormal’ by Béziau [11])
are logics that successfully handle these two types of indefinite data, and so they have the
following two properties:
Paraconsistency [13]: The ability to properly handle contradictory data by rejecting the
principle of explosion, in which any proposition can be inferred from an inconsistent set
of assumptions.
Paracompleteness: The ability to properly handle incomplete data by rejecting the law
of excluded middle, in which for any proposition, either that proposition is ‘true’ or its
negation is ‘true’.
Apart of these two primary requirements, a ‘decent’ logic for reasoning with indefinite data
should have some further characteristics, like being expressive enough, faithful to classical
logic as much as possible (in the sense that entailments in the logic should also hold in classical
logic), and having some maximality properties (which may be intuitively interpreted by the
aspiration to retain as much of classical logic as possible, while preserving paraconsistency
and paracompleteness).
In this paper we are interested in the ‘simplest’ paradefinite logics (in terms of the number
of the truth values of their semantics) that have the above properties. Obviously, two-valued
logics are not adequate for this, as they cannot handle either of the two types of uncertainty.
Likewise, three-valued logics can be used for handling just one type of uncertainty (see,
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e.g., [5]), but they cannot simultaneously handle both of them. On the other hand, as shown
e.g. in [10] and [2], four truth values are enough for reasoning with incompleteness and
inconsistency.
This paper is a largely extended study of the work on 4-valued logics mentioned above.
Among others, we characterize the 4-valued paradefinite matrices, consider the induced
logics, examine them according to the criteria in [3], investigate their relative strengths, and
introduce corresponding sound and complete Hilbert-type and Gentzen-type proof systems.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Propositional Logics
In what follows we denote by L a propositional language with a set Atoms(L) = {P1, P2, . . .}
of atomic formulas and use p, q, r to vary over this set. The set of the well-formed formulas
of L is denoted by W(L) and ϕ,ψ, φ, σ will vary over its elements. The set Atoms(ϕ) denotes
the atomic formulas occurring in ϕ. Sets of formulas in W(L) are called theories and are
denoted by T or T ′. Finite theories are denoted by Γ or ∆. We shall abbreviate T ∪ {ψ}
by T , ψ and write T , T ′ instead of T ∪ T ′. A rule in a language L is a pair 〈Γ, ψ〉, where
Γ ∪ {ψ} is a finite theory. We shall henceforth denote such a rule by Γ/ψ.
I Definition 2.1. A (propositional) logic is a pair L = 〈L,`〉, such that L is a propositional
language, and ` is a binary relation between theories in W(L) and formulas in W(L),
satisfying the following conditions:
Reflexivity: if ψ ∈ T then T ` ψ.
Monotonicity: if T ` ψ and T ⊆ T ′, then T ′ ` ψ.
Transitivity: if T ` ψ and T ′, ψ ` φ then T , T ′ ` φ.
Structurality: for every substitution θ and every T and ψ, if T ` ψ then {θ(ϕ) | ϕ ∈
T } ` θ(ψ).
Non-Triviality: there is a non-empty theory T and a formula ψ such that T 6` ψ.
A logic 〈L,`〉 is finitary if for every theory T and every formula ψ such that T ` ψ there is
a finite theory Γ ⊆ T such that Γ ` ψ.
Note that the languages that are considered in the sequel are all propositional, as this is
the heart of every paraconsistent and paracomplete logic ever studied so far. Also, we confine
ourselves to paradefinite logics, thus no form of non-monotonic reasoning is considered in
this paper.
I Definition 2.2. Let L = 〈L,`〉 be a logic, and let S be a set of rules in L. The finitary
L-closure CL(S) of S is inductively defined as follows:
〈θ(Γ), θ(ψ)〉 ∈ CL(S), where θ is an L-substitution, Γ is a finite theory in W(L), and
either Γ ` ψ or Γ/ψ ∈ S.
If the pairs 〈Γ1, ϕ〉 and 〈Γ2 ∪ {ϕ}, ψ〉 are both in CL(S), then so is the pair 〈Γ1 ∪ Γ2, ψ〉.
Next we define what an extension of a logic means.
I Definition 2.3. Let L = 〈L,`〉 be a logic, and let S be a set of rules in L.
A logic L′ = 〈L,`′〉 is an extension of L (in the same language) if `⊆`′. We say that L′
is a proper extension of L, if `( `′.
The extension of L by S is the pair L∗ = 〈L,`∗〉, where `∗ is the binary relation between
theories in W(L) and formulas in W(L), defined by: T `∗ ψ if there is a finite Γ ⊆ T
such that 〈Γ, ψ〉 ∈ CL(S).
Extending L by an axiom schema ϕ means extending it by the rule ∅/ϕ.
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The usefulness of a logic strongly depends on the question what kind of connectives are
available in it. Three particularly important types of connectives are defined next.
I Definition 2.4. Let L = 〈L,`〉 be a propositional logic.
A binary connective ⊃ of L is an implication for L, if the classical deduction theorem
holds for ⊃ and `, that is: T , ϕ ` ψ iff T ` ϕ ⊃ ψ.
A binary connective ∧ of L is a conjunction for L, if T ` ψ ∧ ϕ iff T ` ψ and T ` ϕ.
A binary connective ∨ of L is a disjunction for L, if T , ψ∨ϕ ` σ iff T , ψ ` σ and T , ϕ ` σ.
We say that L is semi-normal if it has (at least) one of the three basic connectives defined
above. We say that L is normal if it has all these three connectives.
2.2 Many-Valued Matrices
The most standard semantic way of defining many-valued logics is by using the following
type of structures (see, e.g., [19, 20, 25]).
I Definition 2.5. A (multi-valued) matrix for a language L is a tripleM = 〈V,D,O〉, where
V is a non-empty set of truth values,
D is a non-empty proper subset of V, called the designated elements of V, and
O is a function that associates an n-ary function ˜M : Vn→V with every n-ary connective
 of the language L.
In what follows, we shall denote by D the elements in V \D. The set D is used for defining
satisfiability and validity as defined below:
I Definition 2.6. LetM = 〈V,D,O〉 be a matrix for L.
AnM-valuation for L is a function ν :W(L)→V such that for every n-ary connective 
of L and every ψ1, . . . , ψn ∈ W(L), ν((ψ1, . . . , ψn)) = ˜M(ν(ψ1), . . . , ν(ψn)). We denote
by ΛM the set of all theM-valuations.
A valuation ν∈ΛM is anM-model of a formula ψ (alternatively, ν M-satisfies ψ), if it
belongs to the set modM(ψ) = {ν ∈ ΛM | ν(ψ) ∈ D}. TheM-models of a theory T are
the elements of the set modM(T ) = ∩ψ∈T modM(ψ).
A formula ψ isM-satisfiable ifmodM(ψ) 6= ∅. A theory T isM-satisfiable ifmodM(T ) 6=
∅.
In the sequel, when it is clear from the context, we shall sometimes omit the subscript
‘M’ and the tilde sign from ˜M, and the prefix ‘M’ from the notions above.
I Definition 2.7. Let M = 〈V,D,O〉 be a matrix for a language L, and let L ⊆ L′. A
matrixM′ = 〈V ′,D′,O′〉 for L′ is called an expansion ofM to L′, if V = V ′, D = D′, and
O′() = O() for every connective  of L.
I Definition 2.8. Given a matrixM, the consequence relation `M that is induced by (or
associated with)M, is defined by: T `M ψ if modM(T ) ⊆ modM(ψ). We denote by LM
the pair 〈L,`M〉, whereM is a matrix for L and `M is the consequence relation induced by
M.
I Theorem 2.9 ([21, 22]). For every propositional language L and finite matrixM for L,
LM = 〈L,`M〉 is a propositional logic. IfM is finite, then `M is also finitary.
We conclude this section with some simple, easily verified properties of the basic connect-
ives (Definition 2.4).
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I Definition 2.10. LetM = 〈V,D,O〉 be a matrix for L and let A ⊆ V.
An n-ary connective  of L is called A-closed if ˜(a1, . . . , an) ∈ A for every a1, . . . , an ∈ A.
An n-ary connective  of L is called A-limited if for every a1, . . . , an ∈ V , if ˜(a1, . . . , an) ∈
A then a1, . . . , an ∈ A.
I Definition 2.11. LetM = 〈V,D,O〉 be a matrix for L.
A connective ∧ in L is called anM-conjunction if it is D-closed and D-limited, i.e., for
every a, b ∈ V, a ∧ b ∈ D iff a ∈ D and b ∈ D.
A connective ∨ in L is called anM-disjunction if it is D-closed and D-limited, i.e., for
every a, b ∈ V, a ∨ b ∈ D iff a ∈ D or b ∈ D.
A connective ⊃ in L is called anM-implication if for every a, b ∈ V, a ⊃ b ∈ D iff either
a 6∈ D or b ∈ D.
Using the terminologies in Definitions 2.4 and 2.11, we have:
I Theorem 2.12. LetM = 〈V,D,O〉 be a matrix for L.
1. A connective is anM-conjunction iff it is a conjunction for LM.
2. AnM-disjunction is also a disjunction for LM.
3. AnM-implication is also an implication for LM.
I Corollary 2.13. Let M = 〈V,D,O〉 be a matrix for L, and let M′ be an expansion
ofM.
1. AnM-conjunction (respectively: M-disjunction,M-implication) is also a conjunction
(respectively: disjunction, implication) for LM′ .
2. If M has either an M-conjunction, or an M-disjunction, or an M-implication, then
LM′ is semi-normal. IfM has all of them then LM′ is normal.
3 Paradefinite Logics
In this section we define in precise terms what paradefinite logics are, and consider some
related desirable properties.
I Definition 3.1. Let L be a propositional language with a unary connective ¬, and let
L = 〈L,`L〉 be a logic for L.
L is called pre-¬-paraconsistent if there are formulas ψ,ϕ such that ψ,¬ψ 6`L ϕ.
L is called pre-¬-paracomplete if there is a theory T and formulas ψ,ϕ such that T , ψ `L ϕ
and T ,¬ψ `L ϕ, but T 6`L ϕ.
The first property above intends to capture the idea that a contradictory set of premises
should not entail every formula, and the second property indicates that it may happen that
a certain statement and its negation do not hold. Both of these intuitions make sense only
if the underlying connective ¬ somehow represents a ‘negation’ operation. This is assured
by the condition of ‘coherence with classical logic’, which is defined next. Intuitively, this
condition states that a logic that has such a connective should not admit entailments that
do not hold in classical logic.
I Definition 3.2. Let L be a language with a unary connective ¬. A bivalent ¬-interpretation
for L is a function F that associates a two-valued truth table with each connective of L, such
that F(¬) is the classical truth table for negation. We denote byMF the two-valued matrix
for L induced by F, that is,MF = 〈{t, f}, {t},F〉 (see Definition 2.5).
I Definition 3.3. Let L = 〈L,`L〉 be a propositional logic where L contains a unary
connective ¬.
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Let F be a bivalent ¬-interpretation for L. We say that L is F-contained in classical
logic if for every ϕ1, . . . , ϕn, ψ ∈ W(L), if ϕ1, . . . ϕn `L ψ then ϕ1, . . . , ϕn `MF ψ.
L is ¬-contained in classical logic [3], if it is F-contained in it for a bivalent ¬-inter-
pretation F.
L is ¬-coherent with classical logic, if it has a semi-normal fragment (Definition 2.4) which
is ¬-contained in classical logic.
I Definition 3.4. Let L = 〈L,`L〉 be a propositional logic where L contains a unary
connective ¬. We say that ¬ is a negation for L, if L is ¬-coherent with classical logic.
I Remark. If ¬ is a negation for L = 〈L,`L〉, then for every atom p ∈ Atoms(L) it holds
that p 6`L ¬p and ¬p 6`L p.
I Definition 3.5. Let L be a language with a unary connective ¬, and L = 〈L,`L〉 a logic
for L.
L is called ¬-paraconsistent if it is pre-¬-paraconsistent and ¬ is a negation of L.
L is called ¬-paracomplete if it is pre-¬-paracomplete and ¬ is a negation of L.
L is called ¬-paradefinite if it is ¬-paraconsistent and ¬-paracomplete.
Henceforth we shall frequently omit the ¬ sign (if it is clear from the context), and simply
refer to paradefinite [paraconsistent, paracomplete] logics.
4 Four-Valued Paradefinite Matrices
We now show that the availability of at least four different truth values is needed for
developing paradefinite logics in the framework of matrices. We then characterize the
structure of four-valued paradefinite matrices.
In what follows we suppose thatM = 〈V,D,O〉 is a matrix for a language with ¬. We
say thatM is paradefinite [paraconsistent, paracomplete] if so is LM (Definition 2.8).
I Theorem 4.1.
1. M is pre-paraconsistent iff there is an element > ∈ D, such that ¬˜> ∈ D.
2. IfM is paraconsistent then there are three different elements t, f , and > in V such that
f = ¬˜t, f 6∈ D, and {t, ¬˜f,>, ¬˜>} ⊆ D.
Proof. M is pre-paraconsistent iff p,¬p 6`M q. Obviously, this happens iff {p,¬p} has an
M-model. The latter, in turn, is possible iff there is some > ∈ D, such that ¬˜> ∈ D, as
indicated in the first item of the theorem. For the second item we may assume without loss
of generality thatM is ¬-contained in classical logic. We let F be a bivalent ¬-interpretation
such that LM is F-contained in classical logic. Since p,¬¬p 6`MF ¬p, also p,¬¬p 6`M ¬p,
and so there is some t ∈ D, such that ¬˜t 6∈ D, while ¬˜¬˜t ∈ D. Let f = ¬˜t. Then t and f
have the required properties, and together with the first item we are done. J
I Theorem 4.2.
1. IfM is pre-paracomplete then there is an element ⊥ ∈ V such that ⊥ 6∈ D and ¬˜⊥ 6∈ D.
2. IfM has anM-disjunction and there is an element ⊥ ∈ V such that ⊥ 6∈ D and ¬˜⊥ 6∈ D,
thenM is pre-paracomplete.
Proof. Suppose first that M is pre-paracomplete. Then there is a set of formulas Γ and
formulas ψ, φ, such that (i) Γ, ψ `M φ, (ii) Γ,¬ψ `M φ, and (iii) Γ 6`M φ. From (iii)
it follows that there is a valuation ν ∈ modM(Γ) \ modM(φ). Thus, in order to satisfy
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conditions (i) and (ii), necessarily ν(ψ) 6∈ D and ¬˜ν(ψ) = ν(¬ψ) 6∈ D. Hence ν(ψ) is the
element ⊥ as required.
For the second item, suppose that its two conditions are satisfied. Let ∨ be an M-
disjunction. Then by Theorem 2.12, p `M ¬p ∨ p and ¬p `M ¬p ∨ p. However, if ν(p) = ⊥
then ν(¬p ∨ p) 6∈ D by the definitions of ⊥ and of an M-disjunction. Hence M is pre-
paracomplete. J
By the theorems above, no 2-valued matrix can be paraconsistent or paracomplete, and
no 3-valued matrix can be paradefinite. Also, by Theorem 4.1, every paraconsistent (and so
every paradefinite) matrix should have at least two designated elements. The structures of
the minimally-valued paradefinite matrices is considered next.
I Theorem 4.3. IfM = 〈V,D,O〉 is a ¬-paradefinite matrix then there are four elements
t,f ,>, and ⊥ in V such that: (1) t ∈ D and ¬˜t 6∈ D, (2) f 6∈ D and ¬˜f ∈ D, (3) > ∈ D and
¬˜> ∈ D, (4) ⊥ 6∈ D and ¬˜⊥ 6∈ D, (5) ¬˜t = f .
Proof. This follows from Theorems 4.1 and 4.2. J
I Corollary 4.4. LetM be a ¬-paradefinite four-valued matrix. ThenM is isomorphic to
a matrix of the form M′ = 〈{t, f,>,⊥}, {t,>},O〉, in which ¬˜t = f , ¬˜f = t, ¬˜> ∈ {t,>},
and ¬˜⊥ ∈ {f,⊥}.
In the rest of this paper we shall assume that the 4-valued matrices we study have the
form described in Corollary 4.4,
5 Dunn-Belnap’s Matrix FOUR
Theorem 4.4 leaves exactly four possible interpretations for ¬ in four-valued paradefinite
matrices. However, the next theorem and its corollary show that the Dunn-Belnap negation
([9, 10, 14, 15]) is by far more natural than the others.1
I Theorem 5.1. LetM be a ¬-paradefinite 4-valued matrix. Then:
1. If ¬ is left involutive for LM (that is, ¬¬p `LM p) then ¬⊥ = ⊥.
2. If ¬ is right involutive for LM (that is, p `LM¬¬p) then ¬>=>.
Proof. Suppose that ¬ is left involutive. Then ¬¬p `M p, and so ¬⊥ 6= f (otherwise, by
Corollary 4.4 ν(p) = ⊥ would have been a counter-model). It follows that ¬⊥ = ⊥. Suppose
now that ¬ is right involutive. Then p `M ¬¬p, and so ¬> 6= t (otherwise, by Corollary 4.4
again, ν(p) = > would have been a counter-model). Thus ¬> = >. J
I Corollary 5.2. The only involutive negation of paradefinite 4-valued logics is Dunn-Belnap
negation, defined by ¬t = f , ¬f = t, ¬> = > and ¬⊥ = ⊥.
Concerning the interpretations of the other connectives, we again follow Belnap’s motiva-
tion in [9] and [10], where he suggested a four-valued framework for collecting and processing
information (this work was later generalized in [7]): Assume a set of sources, each one of
them can indicate that an atom p is true (i.e., it assigns p the truth-value 1), false (i.e., it
assigns p the truth-value 0), or that it has no knowledge about p. In turn, a mediator assigns
1 For convenience, we shall denote the interpretation of ¬ by ¬ as well. A similar convention will be
usually used for any other connective.
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to an atomic formula p a subset d(p) of {0, 1} as follows: 1 ∈ d(p) iff some source claims that
p is true, and 0 ∈ d(p) iff some source claims that p is false. The mediator’s evaluation of
complex formulas over {¬,∨} is then derived as follows:
0 ∈ d(¬ϕ) iff 1 ∈ d(ϕ),
1 ∈ d(¬ϕ) iff 0 ∈ d(ϕ),
1 ∈ d(ϕ ∨ ψ) iff 1 ∈ d(ϕ) or 1 ∈ d(ψ),
0 ∈ d(ϕ ∨ ψ) iff 0 ∈ d(ϕ) and 0 ∈ d(ψ).
In this model, ν(ϕ)={0, 1} means that ϕ is known to be true and also known to be false
(i.e., the information about ϕ is inconsistent). ν(ϕ)={1} means that ϕ is only known to be
true, while ν(ϕ)={0} means that ϕ is only known to be false. Finally, ν(ϕ)=∅ means that
there is no information about ϕ. This observation leads to the following identification of the
four truth-values with the subsets of {0, 1}: t = {1}, f = {0},> = {0, 1},⊥ = ∅.
Accordingly, the truth tables for ¬ and ∨ that the above principles lead to are the
following (where the connective ∧ is defined by: ϕ ∧ ψ =Df ¬(¬ϕ ∨ ¬ψ)):
∨˜ t f > ⊥
t t t t t
f t f > ⊥
> t > > t
⊥ t ⊥ t ⊥
∧˜ t f > ⊥
t t f > ⊥
f f f f f
> > f > f






I Definition 5.3. The Dunn-Belnap basic matrix for the language LFOUR = {¬,∨,∧} (or
just {¬,∨}) is the matrix FOUR = 〈V,D,O〉, where V = {t, f,>,⊥}, D = {t,>}, and the
interpretations of the connectives are given by the truth tables above.
I Remark. Another, dual representation of FOUR uses pairs from {1, 0}×{1, 0}. Given such
a pair 〈a, b〉, the first component intuitively represents the information about the truth of a
formula, and the second one represents the information about its falsity. According to this
representation, we have that t = 〈1, 0〉, f = 〈0, 1〉, > = 〈1, 1〉, ⊥ = 〈0, 0〉, 〈a1, b1〉 ∨ 〈a2, b2〉 =
〈max(a1, b1),min(a2, b2)〉, 〈a1, b1〉∧〈a2, b2〉 = 〈min(a1, b1),max(a2, b2)〉, and ¬〈a, b〉 = 〈b, a〉.
This representation is useful for a number of applications (see, e.g., [1, 4, 8, 17]).
A common way of defining and understanding the disjunction, conjunction and negation
of FOUR is with respect to the partial order ≤t on {t, f,>,⊥}, in which t is the maximal
element, f is the minimal element, and >,⊥ are intermediate ≤t-incomparable elements.
This order may be intuitively understood as reflecting differences in the amount of truth that
each element exhibits. Here, ∧˜ and ∨˜ are the meet and the join (respectively) of ≤t, and ¬˜
is order reversing with respect to ≤t. Note that this interpretation of ¬ coincides with that
of the unique involutive negation of paradefinite four-valued logics given in Corollary 5.2.
For characterizing the expressive power of the languages of FOUR it is convenient to
order the truth-values in the partial order ≤k that intuitively reflects differences in the amount
of knowledge (or information) that the truth values convey. According to this relation > is
the maximal element, ⊥ is the minimal element, and t, f are intermediate ≤k-incomparable
elements.
Together, the lattices 〈{t, f,>,⊥},≤t〉 and 〈{t, f,>,⊥},≤k〉 form a single four-valued
structure (denoted again by FOUR), known as Belnap’s bilattice ([9, 10]), which is repres-
ented in the double-Hasse diagram of Figure 1.
Following Fitting’s notations (see [16]), we shall denote the join and the meet of ≤k by ⊕
and ⊗ (respectively). The ≤k-reversing function on {t, f,>,⊥} which is dual to ¬˜ is called
conflation [16], and the corresponding connective is usually denoted by −. The truth tables
of these ≤k-connectives are given below.
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Figure 1 The bilattice FOUR
⊕˜ t f > ⊥
t t > > t
f > f > f
> > > > >
⊥ t f > ⊥
⊗˜ t f > ⊥
t t ⊥ t ⊥
f ⊥ f f ⊥
> t f > ⊥






6 Important Expansions of FOUR
As noted before, the logic LFOUR (also denoted 4Basic), induced by FOUR, has some
appealing applications in the context of logics for AI. Also, it has some desirable properties,
like being semi-normal (it is easy to verify that ∨ is a FOUR-disjunction and that ∧ is a
FOUR-conjunction), paradefinite, and ¬-contained in classical logic. However, 4Basic also
has some drawbacks, one of which is considered next.
I Theorem 6.1. 4Basic is not normal (since no implication is definable in it).
Sketch of proof. Note, first, that every n-valued function g : {t, f,>,⊥}n → {t, f,>,⊥}
which is representable in the language of {∨,∧,¬} 2 must be ≤k-monotonic, i.e., if ai ≤k bi
for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n then g(a1, . . . , an) ≤k g(b1, . . . , bn) as well. This implies that only
≤k-monotonic connectives are definable in this language. Now, suppose for contradiction that
⊃ is a definable implication for 4Basic. In particular, one may verify that (i) `4Basic p ⊃ p,
and (ii) p, p ⊃ q `4Basic q. Now, (i) entails that ⊃˜(f, f) ∈ {t,>}. Therefore, it follows from
the ≤k-monotonicity of ⊃ that ⊃˜(>, f) ∈ {t,>}. This contradicts (ii), since it is refuted by
any assignment ν such that ν(p) = > and ν(q) = f . J
The last theorem, together with the fact that definable functions in the language of
{∨,∧,¬} are {⊥}-closed (and so no tautologies are available in this language), imply that
the language of FOUR is rather limited, even if we add to it propositional constants for
2 That is, there is a formula ψ in {∨,∧,¬}, such that Atoms(ψ) ⊆ {P1, . . . , Pn}, and for every a1, . . . , an ∈
{t, f,>,⊥} it holds that g(a1, . . . , an) = ν(ψ), where ν ∈ ΛFOUR is defined by ν(Pi) = ai for all
1 ≤ i ≤ n.
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the two classical truth-values. Therefore, we now introduce several other useful and natural
connectives on {t, f,>,⊥} that cannot be defined in the language of FOUR.
The following connective is anM-implication for every paradefinite four-valued matrix
M (of the form considered in Corollary 4.4), in which it is definable:
a⊃˜b =
{
b if a ∈ {t,>},
t if a ∈ {f,⊥}.
We denote by t, f, c (contradictory) and u (unknown) the propositional constants to
be interpreted, respectively, by the truth-values t,f ,>, and ⊥ (thus, for instance, ∀ν∈
ΛM ν(c)=>).
Using the connectives above, in the following sections we shall consider some important
expansions of the matrix FOUR.3
6.1 A Maximal Expansion
First, we consider expansions of FOUR in which all the operations on {t, f,>,⊥} are
definable.
IDefinition 6.2. Let LAll = {¬,∨,∧,−,⊕,⊗,⊃, f, t, c, u}. The matrixMAll is the expansion
of FOUR to LAll. The logic that is induced by MAll is denoted by 4All (or, as before,
LMAll).
As the next theorem shows, the set of connectives in LAll (and actually a proper subset
of it) is indeed sufficient for defining any operation on {t, f,>,⊥}.
I Theorem 6.3. The language of {¬,∨,∧,⊃, c, u} is functionally complete for {t, f,>,⊥}.
I Remark. Since ⊥ = f ⊗ ¬f while > = f ⊕ ¬f , the language of {¬,∨,∧,⊃,⊗,⊕, f} is also
functionally complete for {t, f,>,⊥}. The use of this language has a certain advantage of
modularity over the use of {¬,∨,∧,⊃, c, u}, since it has been proved in [6] that if Ξ is a subset
of {⊗,⊕, f}, then a function g : {t, f,>,⊥}n → {t, f,>,⊥} is representable in {¬,∧,⊃} ∪ Ξ
iff it is S-closed for every S ∈ {{>}, {t, f,>}, {t, f,⊥}} for which all the (functions that
directly correspond to the) connectives in Ξ are S-closed. In other words:
I Theorem 6.4.
g is representable in {¬,∨,∧,⊃} iff it is {>}-closed, {t, f,⊥}-closed, and {t, f,>}-closed.
g is representable in {¬,∨,∧,⊃, f} iff it is {t, f,⊥}-closed and {t, f,>}-closed.
g is representable in {¬,∨,∧,⊃,⊕} iff it is {>}-closed and {t, f,>}-closed.
g is representable in {¬,∨,∧,⊃,⊗} iff it is {>}-closed and {t, f,⊥}-closed.
g is representable in {¬,∨,∧,⊃,⊗, f} iff it is {t, f,⊥}-closed.
g is representable in {¬,∨,∧,⊃,⊕,⊗} iff it is {>}-closed.
g is representable in {¬,∨,∧,⊃,⊕, f} iff it is {t, f,>}-closed.
g is representable in {¬,∨,∧,⊃,⊕,⊗, f}.
3 Due to lack of space, proofs in the rest of this paper are omitted. Complete proofs will be provided in
the full version of the paper.
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It is also worth noting that it is easy to find examples that show that the eight fragments
in the theorem above are different from each other (see [2] and [6]).
Note thatMAll, like any other 4-valued matrix where the ≤k-meet ⊗, the ≤k-join ⊕, or
either of the propositional constants c and u is definable in its language, is not {t, f}-closed
(indeed, a⊕ b 6∈ {t, f} and a⊗ b 6∈ {t, f} for any a 6= b ∈ {t, f}). This implies that 4All is
only ¬-coherent with classical logic but not ¬-included in it.
I Theorem 6.5. The logic 4All is paradefinite and normal.
The next theorem follows from the fact that 4All has no proper extensions (in the same
language).
I Theorem 6.6. The logic 4All (unlike the logic 4Basic!) is maximally paraconsistent in
the sense that every proper extension of 4All (Definition 2.3) is not pre-paraconsistent.
6.2 A Maximal Monotonic Expansion
In [10] Belnap suggested to use the sources-mediator model described previously only for
languages with monotonic interpretations of the connectives. The reason was to achieve
stability in the sense that the arrival of new data from new sources does not change previous
knowledge about truth and falsity. From Belnap’s point of view an optimal language for
information processing is therefore a language in which it is possible to represent all monotonic
functions, and only monotonic functions. Next we show that not much should be added to
the basic language of {¬,∨,∧} (or just {¬,∨}) in order to obtain such a language.
I Definition 6.7. Let LMon = {¬,∨,∧, c, u}. We denote byMMon the expansion of FOUR
to LMon. The logic that is induced byMMon is denoted by 4Mon.
I Theorem 6.8. A function g :{t, f,>,⊥}n→{t, f,>,⊥} is representable in LMon iff it is
≤k-monotonic (i.e., if ai ≤k bi for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n then g(a1, . . . , an) ≤k g(b1, . . . , bn)).
I Corollary 6.9. The logic 4Mon contains every logic which is induced by a matrix of the
form of Corollary 4.4 that employs only monotonic functions.
I Theorem 6.10. The logic 4Mon is paradefinite. It has no proper extensions in its language,
and so it is maximally paraconsistent (see Theorem 6.6).
6.3 A Maximal Classically Closed Expansion
We now examine the maximal expansions of FOUR by connectives that are {t, f}-closed.
I Definition 6.11. Let LCC = {¬,−,∨,∧,⊃}. We denote byMCC the expansion of FOUR
to LCC . The logic that is induced byMCC is denoted by 4CC.
I Theorem 6.12. A function g :{t, f,>,⊥}n→{t, f,>,⊥} is representable in LCC iff it is
{t, f}-closed.
I Corollary 6.13. The logic 4CC contains every logic which is induced by a matrix of the
form of Corollary 4.4 and is ¬-contained in classical logic.
I Theorem 6.14. The logic 4CC is paradefinite and normal. It is ¬-contained in classical
logic and has no proper extensions in its language, thus it is maximally paraconsistent (in
the sense described in Theorem 6.6).
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We note, in addition to the properties considered in Proposition 6.14, that 4CC is also
maximal relative to classical logic. This means, intuitively, that any attempt to add to it
a tautology of classical logic which is not provable in 4CC should necessarily end-up with
classical logic (see [3] for the exact definition of this property).
6.4 A Maximal Non-Exploding Expansion
Next, we consider the maximal expansions of FOUR which are non-exploding in the following
sense:
I Definition 6.15. A logic 〈L,`〉 is non-exploding, if for every theory T in L such that
Atoms(T ) 6= Atoms(L) there is a formula ψ in L such that T 6` ψ.
I Definition 6.16. Let LNex = {¬,∨,∧,⊃,⊕,⊗}. We denote by MNex the expansion of
FOUR to LNex. The logic that is induced byMNex is denoted by 4Nex.
I Theorem 6.17. A function g : {t, f,>,⊥}n → {t, f,>,⊥} is representable in LNex iff it
is {>}-closed.
I Corollary 6.18. The logic 4Nex contains every logic which is induced by a matrix of the
form of Corollary 4.4 and is non-exploding.
I Theorem 6.19. The logic 4Nex is paradefinite. It is non-exploding but not ¬-contained
in classical logic. Also, 4Nex has no proper extensions in its language, thus it is maximally
paraconsistent.
6.5 A Maximal Flexible Expansion
The combination of {t, f,>}-closure and {t, f,⊥}-closure is a very desirable property, since
it allows flexibility in the use of the four basic truth-values. Obviously, there is no point
in using c in case no contradiction is expected, while in the dual case there is no point in
using u. The use of connectives which have both of the above properties ensures that one
can easily switch from the use of the four-valued framework to the use of the appropriate
3-valued framework. Also, this combination is a natural strengthening of the condition of
classical closure. These considerations motivate the four-valued logic introduced next.
I Definition 6.20. A function g : {t, f,>,⊥}n → {t, f,>,⊥} is called flexible iff it is both
{t, f,>}-closed and {t, f,⊥}-closed.
Obviously, every flexible function is classically closed, but the converse is not true.
I Definition 6.21. Let LFlex = {¬,∨,∧,⊃, f}. We denote by MFlex the expansion of
FOUR to LFlex. The logic that is induced byMFlex is denoted by 4Flex.
I Theorem 6.22. A function g : {t, f,>,⊥}n → {t, f,>,⊥} is representable in LFlex iff it
is flexible.
I Corollary 6.23. The logic 4Flex contains every logic that is induced by a matrix of the
form of Corollary 4.4 and employs only flexible connectives.
I Theorem 6.24. The logic 4Flex is a paradefinite and normal. It is ¬-contained in classical
logic and not non-exploding. This logic is neither maximally paraconsistent nor maximally
paraconsistent relative to classical logic.
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6.6 The Classical Expansion
The last expansion of FOUR we present is the maximal one which is both non-explosive and
flexible.
I Definition 6.25. Let LCL = {¬,∨,∧,⊃}. We denote byM4CL is the expansion of FOUR
to LCL. The logic that is induced byM4CL is denoted by 4CL.
I Theorem 6.26. A function g : {t, f,>,⊥}n → {t, f,>,⊥} is representable in LCL iff it is
flexible and {>}-closed.
I Corollary 6.27. The logic 4CL contains every non-exploding logic which is induced by a
matrix of the form of Corollary 4.4 and employs only flexible connectives.
I Theorem 6.28. The logic 4CL is paradefinite and normal. It is ¬-contained in classical
logic and non-exploding. This logic is neither maximally paraconsistent nor maximally
paraconsistent relative to classical logic.
7 Proof Theory
We conclude by considering proof systems for the ¬-paradefinite logics presented in this
paper.
7.1 Gentzen-type Systems
First, we consider Gentzen-type systems [18]. We show that each of the logics considered
here has a corresponding cut-free, sound and complete sequent calculus, which is a fragment
of the sequent calculus G4All, presented in Figure 2.
For each L ∈ {4All,4Mon,4CC,4Nex,4Flex,4CL,4Basic} we denote by GL the
restriction of G4All to the language of L (i.e., the Gentzen-type system in the language
of L whose axioms and rules are the axioms and rules of G4All which are relevant to that
language). Also, we denote by `GL the consequence relation induced by GL, that is: T `GL ϕ,
if there exists a finite Γ ⊆ T such that Γ⇒ϕ is provable in GL from the empty set of sequents
(see, e.g., [23] and [24]).
I Theorem 7.1. For each L ∈ {4All,4Mon,4CC,4Nex,4Flex,4CL,4Basic} GL is
sound and complete for L: T `GL ψ iff T `L ψ. Moreover, GL admits cut-elimination.
7.2 Hilbert-type Systems
Next, we consider sound and complete Hilbert-type systems for ¬-paradefinite logics which
have an implication connective. Again, we show that these are fragments of the same proof
system, which has Modus Ponens [MP] as its sole rule of inference.
Consider the proof system H4All in Figure 3. For L ∈ {4All,4CC,4Nex,4Flex,4CL}
we denote by HL the restriction of H4All to the language of L (i.e., the Hilbert-type system
in the language of L whose axioms and rules are the axioms and rules of H4All which are
relevant to that language). We denote by `HL the consequence relation induced by HL.
I Theorem 7.2. For every L ∈ {4All,4CC,4Nex,4Flex,4CL} we have that `HL = `GL .
By Theorems 7.1 and 7.2 we also have the following result.
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Axioms: ψ ⇒ ψ
Structural Rules:
Weakening: Γ⇒ ∆Γ,Γ′ ⇒ ∆,∆′ Cut:
Γ1 ⇒ ∆1, ψ Γ2, ψ ⇒ ∆2
Γ1,Γ2 ⇒ ∆1,∆2
Logical Rules:
[∧⇒] Γ, ψ, ϕ⇒ ∆Γ, ψ ∧ ϕ⇒ ∆ [⇒∧]
Γ⇒ ∆, ψ Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ
Γ⇒ ∆, ψ ∧ ϕ
[∨⇒] Γ, ψ ⇒ ∆ Γ, ϕ⇒ ∆Γ, ψ ∨ ϕ⇒ ∆ [⇒∨]
Γ⇒ ∆, ψ, ϕ
Γ⇒ ∆, ψ ∨ ϕ
[⊃⇒] Γ⇒ ψ,∆ Γ, ϕ⇒ ∆Γ, ψ ⊃ ϕ⇒ ∆ [⇒⊃]
Γ, ψ ⇒ ϕ,∆
Γ⇒ ψ ⊃ ϕ,∆
[⊗⇒] Γ, ψ, φ⇒ ∆Γ, ψ ⊗ φ⇒ ∆ [⇒⊗]
Γ⇒ ∆, ψ Γ⇒ ∆, φ
Γ⇒ ∆, ψ ⊗ φ
[⊕⇒] Γ, ψ ⇒ ∆ Γ, φ⇒ ∆Γ, ψ ⊕ φ⇒ ∆ [⇒⊕]
Γ⇒ ∆, ψ, φ
Γ⇒ ∆, ψ ⊕ φ
[¬¬⇒] Γ, ϕ⇒ ∆Γ,¬¬ϕ⇒ ∆ [⇒¬¬]
Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ
Γ⇒ ∆,¬¬ϕ
[−⇒] Γ,⇒ ∆,¬ψΓ,−ψ ⇒ ∆ [⇒−]
Γ,¬ψ ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ∆,−ψ
[¬−⇒] Γ,⇒ ∆, ψΓ,¬−ψ ⇒ ∆ [⇒¬−]
Γ, ψ ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ∆,¬−ψ
[¬∧⇒] Γ,¬ϕ⇒ ∆ Γ,¬ψ ⇒ ∆Γ,¬(ϕ ∧ ψ)⇒ ∆ [⇒¬∧]
Γ⇒ ∆,¬ϕ,¬ψ
Γ⇒ ∆,¬(ϕ ∧ ψ)
[¬∨⇒] Γ,¬ϕ,¬ψ ⇒ ∆Γ,¬(ϕ ∨ ψ)⇒ ∆ [⇒¬∨]
Γ⇒ ∆,¬ϕ Γ⇒ ∆,¬ψ
Γ⇒ ∆,¬(ϕ ∨ ψ)
[¬⊃⇒] Γ, ϕ,¬ψ ⇒ ∆Γ,¬(ϕ ⊃ ψ)⇒ ∆ [⇒¬⊃]
Γ⇒ ϕ,∆ Γ⇒ ¬ψ,∆
Γ⇒ ¬(ϕ ⊃ ψ),∆
[¬⊗⇒] Γ,¬ψ,¬φ⇒ ∆Γ,¬(ψ ⊗ φ)⇒ ∆ [⇒¬⊗]
Γ⇒ ∆,¬ψ Γ⇒ ∆,¬φ
Γ⇒ ∆,¬(ψ ⊗ φ)
[¬⊕⇒] Γ,¬ψ ⇒ ∆ Γ,¬φ⇒ ∆Γ,¬(ψ ⊕ φ)⇒ ∆ [⇒¬⊕]
Γ⇒ ∆,¬ψ,¬φ
Γ⇒ ∆,¬(ψ ⊕ φ)
[f⇒] Γ, f ⇒ ∆ [⇒¬f] Γ⇒ ∆,¬f
[⇒ c] Γ⇒ ∆, c [⇒¬c] Γ⇒ ∆,¬c
[u⇒] Γ, u⇒ ∆ [¬u⇒] Γ,¬u⇒ ∆
Figure 2 The proof system G4All.
I Corollary 7.3. For every L ∈ {4All,4CC,4Nex,4Flex,4CL}, HL is sound and complete
for L.
I Remark. Other proof systems for paradefinite logics have been considered in the literature,
and in many cases it is possible to show that they are equivalent to some of the proof systems
considered here. For instance, Bou and Rivieccio’s Hilbert-style proof system introduced
in [12] has 23 rules for the language of {¬,∨,∧,⊗,⊕}, and no axioms. In [12] it is shown
that this system is equivalent to the corresponding fragment of G4All, and it is not difficult
to see that it is obtained by a straightforward translation of that system.
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Inference Rule: [MP] ψ ψ ⊃ ϕ
ϕ
Axioms:
[⇒⊃1] ψ ⊃ (ϕ ⊃ ψ)
[⇒⊃2] (ψ ⊃ (ϕ ⊃ τ)) ⊃ ((ψ ⊃ ϕ) ⊃ (ψ ⊃ τ))
[⇒⊃3] ((ψ ⊃ ϕ) ⊃ ψ) ⊃ ψ
[⇒∧⊃] ψ ∧ ϕ ⊃ ψ, ψ ∧ ϕ ⊃ ϕ [⇒⊃∧] ψ ⊃ (ϕ ⊃ ψ ∧ ϕ)
[⇒⊃∨] ψ ⊃ ψ ∨ ϕ, ϕ ⊃ ψ ∨ ϕ [⇒ ∨⊃] (ψ ⊃ τ) ⊃ ((ϕ ⊃ τ) ⊃ (ψ ∨ ϕ ⊃ τ))
[¬¬⇒] ¬¬ϕ ⊃ ϕ [⇒¬¬] ϕ ⊃ ¬¬ϕ
[¬⊃⇒1] ¬(ϕ ⊃ ψ) ⊃ ϕ [¬⊃⇒2] ¬(ϕ ⊃ ψ) ⊃ ¬ψ
[⇒¬⊃] (ϕ ∧ ¬ψ) ⊃ ¬(ϕ ⊃ ψ)
[¬∨⇒1] ¬(ϕ ∨ ψ) ⊃ ¬ϕ [¬∨⇒2] ¬(ϕ ∨ ψ) ⊃ ¬ψ
[⇒¬∨] (¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ) ⊃ ¬(ϕ ∨ ψ)
[¬∧⇒] ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ) ⊃ (¬ϕ ∨ ¬ψ)
[⇒¬∧1] ¬ϕ ⊃ ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ) [⇒¬∧2] ¬ψ ⊃ ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ)
[⇒⊗] ψ ⊃ ϕ ⊃ ψ ⊗ ϕ [⊗⇒] ψ ⊗ ϕ ⊃ ψ, ψ ⊗ ϕ ⊃ ϕ
[⇒⊕] ψ ⊃ ψ ⊕ ϕ, ϕ ⊃ ψ ⊕ ϕ [⊕⇒] (ψ ⊃ τ) ⊃ (ϕ ⊃ τ) ⊃ (ψ ⊕ ϕ ⊃ τ)
[⇒¬⊕] ¬ψ ⊕ ¬ϕ ⊃ ¬(ψ ⊕ ϕ) [¬⊕⇒] ¬(ψ ⊕ ϕ) ⊃ ¬ψ ⊕ ¬ϕ
[⇒¬⊗] ¬ψ ⊗ ¬ϕ ⊃ ¬(ψ ⊗ ϕ) [¬⊗⇒] ¬(ψ ⊗ ϕ) ⊃ ¬ψ ⊗ ¬ϕ
[f⇒] f ⊃ ψ
[u⇒] u ⊃ ψ [⇒c] ψ ⊃ c
[¬u⇒] ¬u ⊃ ψ [⇒¬c] ψ ⊃ ¬c
Figure 3 The proof system H4All.
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